

Zanzibar's Unity Government: A New Episode or Changing Direction of Revolutionary Ideology?

Moh'd Juma Haji^{1*}, Ambrose Kessy²

¹Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dodoma, Tanzania.

²Associate Professor, The Law School of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Correspondent author: mohamed.aprconsultancy@gmail.com

Abstract: In January 1964, Zanzibar witnessed a revolution that overriden the Independence of 1963. The revolution targeted the Arab rulers occupying native land. The revolution produces two contested beliefs in society. The effect of these beliefs became apparent during the single-party and multiparty system starting in 1992, where identity-based politics and political discontent were visible. In 2010, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar began jointly led by the two parties. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi, a descendant of the revolutionary party (Afro-Shiraz Party) and the Civic United Front, shifted to the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT). The CUF is often seen as a descendant of Arab parties (Zanzibar and Pemba People Party), with negative connotations of revolution. This paper explores the Government of National Unity in Zanzibar, a new political episode of revolutionary Government. It delves into the social, political, and economic factors that led revolutionary ideology to embrace a national unity government. The study reveals that the revolution's ideology has gradually changed from politics of isolation and exclusion to nationalization due to natural and artificial factors. These changes are brought by natural and artificial factors, including time, technology, development desire, and generation's shift.

Keywords: Independence, Revolution, National Unity Government, Revolutionary Ideology, Revolutionary Movement.

INTRODUCTION

On 12th January 1964, a group called "African Youth" led the revolution in Zanzibar to overrun the independent Government formed only one month prior. On one side, the revolution aimed explicitly at the minority Arabs who occupied the African land, administration, economy, and means of production¹. Chasing out the Zanzibar Arabs (by birth or registration) is another narrative narrated by the other side of the coin. In any narration, the 1964 revolution produced atrocity in society; primarily, Arabs were the affected race. Some literature called it the worst racial violence revolt in African history, where around a thousand deaths and displaced were witnessed². The revolution of 1964 was not a one-day emerged phenomenon. It has a historic narration and pro-long backgrounds. Race and identity struggle is the primary source of the movement. On one side, Arabs, the owner of the trade and means of production, struggled to remain in their position through election under the British protectorate. This made the black native party (ASP) defeated in every election of 1957, 1961, and 1963 despite their majority. This made the African natives call it Arab-manipulated elections³. As a result, African natives, who have low economic income, use revolution to acquire back what they claim their native land and wealth from outsiders (Arabs and Indians)⁴.

¹ Ramadhani, "Identity Politics and Conflicts in Zanzibar."

² Burgess, "The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath."

³ Eddoumi, "The Zanzibar Revolution of 1964."

⁴ Ramadhani, "Identity Politics and Conflicts in Zanzibar."

The revolution movement and ideology did not end with the Arabs' atrocity on 12th January 1964. Its ideology continues even post-revolution and after the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1992. The supporters of ZNP and ZPPP who strongly battled with ASP (the revolutionary party) were taken as an anti-revolutionary ideology. Thus, they were excluded from the fruit of the revolution, "*Matunda ya Mapinduzi*," which included employment, social services, and political freedom⁵. Due to their strong support of ZPPP and ZNP, Pemba Island was put out of the Government's sight on the revolution fruits benefits⁶. As a result, the Island developed a solid opposition base where the first multiparty election of 1995 made the opposition party (Civic United Front-CUF) win all constituents of Pemba. This situation made some scholars consider CUF a replica of ZNP and ZPPP, which Pemba Island strongly supported⁷. Unguja region is a base of the ASP. The then Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) continued to enjoy the revolution benefits and perceived it was not made for the Pemba people (opposed to revolution)⁸.

The political background of Zanzibar divided society into two political beliefs. The first belief is that the 1964 revolution and its ideology should continue leading Zanzibar. The second belief is that the 1963 independence is true and the revolution is a rebellion genocide⁹. As a result, the Arabs and Pemba Island natives were isolated and excluded from the government benefits as they are called believers of 1963 flag independence. It was taken like mischief for opposers of the 1964 revolution to sit together in a revolutionary Government and enjoy the fruit of the revolution. Yet in 2010, the two opposite sides (CCM, a replica of ASP, and CUF, a replica of ZPP/ZNP) came together. They formed a Government of National Unity to initiate two different ideologies of revolution and work together in the revolutionary Government. The questions to be asked. Does revolution ideology shift to include the opposition in the revolution government? What social, political, and economic elements influence that shift?

Literature Review

Conceptualizing revolution

One critical issue emerging in analyzing the political revolution is the conceptualization of revolution, its magnitude and scope. A political revolution can be defined as irregular and mass-supported governing regime changes¹⁰. The political revolution is termed the high-intensity movement and change in society. According to Davies, the political movement mainly aimed at creating an excellent societal environment (heaven on earth)¹¹. Thus, its main character is the "rapid change of the government and its attempts." Figure 1 shows the low and high-intensity revolutions.

⁵ Triplett, "Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality."

⁶ Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania."

⁷ Longman, "Zanzibar: Religion, Politics, and Identity in East Africa"; Sheriff, "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar."

⁸ Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania."

⁹ Flag independence in Zanzibar was taken place in December, 1963 whereby the Sultan of Oman under British protectorate gives independence Zanzibar. However, the King Jemshid of Oman Sultanate remain as a Head of State and Mohamed Shamte of ZPPP/ZNP become the Prime Minister.

¹⁰ Inwegen, "Revolution."

¹¹ Davies, "Sociological."




Figure 1. Revolution's spectrum'
Source: Inwegen (2011)

Analytically, the political revolution may have several dimensions and aspects. The most essential element is the source of the revolution. According to Rejai, the political revolution results from the disequilibrium of the social system's roles, institutions, and values¹². This situation mainly occurred in society when the ruling elites were unwilling to resolve the problem of disequilibrium. Therefore, the revolution deliberately, successfully, or ineffectively aims to pursue power that will be able to create a brand-new social structure¹³. This means that the political revolution comes as a failure of toleration and satisfaction mechanism of the isolated group. Figure 2 shows the level of tolerance and the revolution that occur.




Figure 2. Need satisfaction and revolution
Source: Davies (2009)

Figure 2 above shows that the revolution becomes apparent when the tolerance level reaches zero. This means that the satisfaction of the people's needs decreases than expected. The case of Zanzibar clearly shows that most natives seem unsatisfied with what the Arabs ruler did to them. From an economic perspective, the native seemed not to own the means of reproduction, including their land. On political matters, the Arab rulers were very calculative and favored the Arabs and other foreigners. Even in the elections, most Africans did not win, as the constituents planned to favor the ruling party. It can be said that the revolution of Zanzibar in 1964 can be well explained using the satisfaction and need reason of revolution.

¹² Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*.

¹³ Gebil, "Causes of Political Revolution."

Zanzibar Revolution: Interpretation and Ideology

Revolution is not a new phenomenon in the globe. About half of the world's inhabitants live in the countries that experienced the revolution¹⁴. Zanzibar represents the African countries that experienced the most violent revolution in the 1960's¹⁵. Kimmel argues, "revolution consists of a forcible, irregular and group supported change in the governing regime." The Zanzibar Revolution 1964 was a turning point in East Africa's history. It was fueled by a complicated mix of political, economic, and historical forces and had far-reaching effects on the native and foreign residents. The Zanzibar revolution consisted of young African natives who used coercive means to withdraw the Arab regime settled on the Island. It was recorded that more than a hundred thousand Arab and Indian race lost their lives. Even though some literature, including Mapuri, argued that only a few Arabs were killed, it was the atrocity of those races¹⁶.

The story of the Zanzibar revolution is complicated and has many interpretations with different perceptions and ideologies. The side of the narrator becomes the truth of the story and the ideology about the revolution of Zanzibar¹⁷. Out of those interpretations of the revolution, two narratives dominate and play a significant role in the past and current understanding of the revolution in Zanzibar. The first interpretation is a nationalist ideology, where the revolution was taken as a nationalist action to restore the African native properties stolen by the intruders (Arabs, Indians, and Persians)¹⁸. The proponents of this interpretation argued that the historical, economic, and political elements that led to the Zanzibar Revolution are among its many fundamental causes. The Arab aristocracy controlled much of the Island's money, land, and commerce, while the African majority was impoverished and denied political rights. The bulk of Africans became very resentful of this economic disparity¹⁹.

Additionally, the British colonial administration's contentious "racial" division of the populace into Arabs, Indians, and Africans heightened tensions. The Arab minority was privileged by the colonial authority, which continued social and political inequalities. This intentional divide-and-conquer approach sowed the unrest that eventually sparked the revolution. The historical, economic, and political elements that led to the Zanzibar Revolution are among its fundamental causes. The Arab aristocracy controlled much of the Island's money, land, and commerce, while the African majority was impoverished and denied political rights. The bulk of Africans became very resentful of this economic disparity.

The second interpretation lies in favoring Arab domination and residence in Zanzibar. This side believes that Arabs reside in Zanzibar, some of whom were born there, including King Jemshid. Thus, they have full authority to lead like any African natives. They argue that the Arab administration did not dominate Africans; they all lived equally and peacefully²⁰. This group maintains that the revolution of 1964 was genocide because the 1963 independence was received through the vote of June 1963²¹. They continued claiming that the revolution was not natural as it involved the invasion of non-Zanzibaris from the Mainland and outside. John Okello is a typical example of the frontlines of the revolution in Zanzibar from Uganda²². This side of interpretation holds water in that the ASP has a close tie with the Mainland, and the struggle for Independence was organized in the Mainland.

¹⁴ Kimmel, "Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity."

¹⁵ Ramadhani, "Identity Politics and Conflicts in Zanzibar."

¹⁶ Mapuri, *The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects*.

¹⁷ Bissell and Fouéré, "Memory, Media, and Mapinduzi."

¹⁸ Ramadhani, "Identity Politics and Conflicts in Zanzibar."

¹⁹ Mapuri, *The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects*; Myers, "Narrative Representations of Revolutionary Zanzibar"; Suhonen, "Mapinduzi Daima – Revolution Forever : Using the 1964 Revolution in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar."

²⁰ Sheriff, "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar."

²¹ Rios, "Report : West Point Undergraduate Historical Review Controlled Chaos : Why The Revolution In Zanzibar Was Not Genocide."

²² Loimeier, "Memories of Revolution:"

Each of the two narratives of the Zanzibar revolution got followers and support from history and the environment. As a result, society is divided into two groups. The supporters of 1963 independence automatically opposed the revolution of 1964. The second group is the supporters of 1964, who perceive the 1963 independence supporters as the enemy of African natives' freedom. The Island's post-revolution politics was affected and reflected from those two perceptions of revolution. This was seen in 1992 after the multiparty re-introduction, where the political parties were based on race and region.

Zanzibar GNU: Synopsis and Structure

The GNU in Zanzibar is not a one-day action. It is a long process that involves several stages. The reconciliation process started after the 1995 election, culminating in electoral violence and civic unrest. Seif Sharif Hamad, the then general secretary of the CUF, and Salmin Amour Juma, the President of Zanzibar at the time, reached an early understanding of reconciliation between the two giants' parties. The Commonwealth of Nations, through its high staff Ameka Anyauku, provided direction for the inaugural reconciliation agreement reached in 1999. This agreement contained both internal and external actors. Nevertheless, the absence of political will, distrust, and ideology prevented the reconciliation²³.

The second reconciliation involves the CCM and CUF parties participating in the October 2000 reconciliation accord. Once more, the agreement was not implemented, which resulted in violent confrontations in January 2001. A dozen killings were reported displaced, and injuries were witnessed also²⁴. Social instability in Zanzibar was exacerbated by the events in January 2001, which convinced elites that the only workable answer to the country's political issues was a power-sharing deal. Among the mentioned bottles of the reconciliation was the history, which is associated with race and revolution echo. The CCM party seems that the opposers of the revolution can't work together with them.

The third reconciliation was taken in 2010, thanks to local efforts. The concept of reconciliation was put into practice, and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGoZ) established a six-member reconciliation committee with three representatives from each party. One of the committee's objectives was to promote the reconciliation process and raise public awareness of the referendum to establish the Government of National Unity in Zanzibar (Minde, Roop, & Tronvoll, 2018). Despite the doubt of citizens on the neutralization committee, the committee of two parties, for the first time in the history of Zanzibar politics, work together under one agenda.

The referendum occurred, and most citizens (67%) agreed to have GNU in Zanzibar. The constitution amendment seals the implementation of GNU, where the two winning parties with ten percent of the vote or at least one seat will share power in the government institution. In Zanzibar, the sharing institutions include the Executive cabinet, Representative cabinet, and ZEC. The party got the post in each shared institution according to the ratio of votes cast in 2020. For instance, in the 2020 general election, the CCM won 46 out of 50 House of Representatives seats, whereas the ACT Wazalendo party won only four votes. Therefore, ACT Wazalendo got two ministers' posts in the Revolutionary Council. 2010, the CCM won 28 seats, whereas the CUF won 22 seats. Hence, the Ministerial posts were divided with 10 CCM (ruling) and 8 CUF (opposition) out of 19 seats.

The power-sharing operated from 2010 up to 2015 before its collapse in 2015. The collapse was after CUF boycotted the re-election of 2016 after the 2015 election failure. As a result, CUF disqualifies interning in the GNU as it does not have 10% of the vote and no seat. After the election, the GNU was

²³ Nassor and Jose, "Journal of Southern African Studies Power-Sharing in Zanzibar : From Zero- Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus ?"

²⁴ Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania"; Roop, Tronvoll, and Minde, "The Politics of Continuity and Collusion in Zanzibar: Political Reconciliation and the Establishment of the Government of National Unity."

back in 2020, where the electoral violence was witnessed. The question is, why is violence back after power-sharing? Some scholars argue that the previous politics of the revolution of 1964 still echoed the current power-sharing politics²⁵.

METHODOLOGY

This work analyses the shift of the revolution ideology to embrace the GNU adoption and its continuity. It provides the historical narratives of how and in what circumstances the revolution ideology was created and implemented even after a GNU introduction. The study needs a narration of different generations on how revolution ideologies change and affect their life. Therefore, it opts for a qualitative method approach with narrative analysis. The narrative analysis enables the researchers to understand the revolution comprehensively and offer a more accurate picture of how society lives with it with time.

Both secondary and primary data were collected. The secondary data from documentary reviews comprises works of literature from scholars who deeply analyze the revolution of Zanzibar and its subject matter²⁶. The reviewed works of literature form the base of this study. The primary data from the in-depth interview was explicitly collected to get opinions and deeply analyze the current situation of revolution ideologies under GNU. Three districts, namely, Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini, were purposively included in the study. The districts have some characteristics of political affiliations in Zanzibar. Micheweni represents the Pemba region, the most opposition base, while Kusini represents a ruling party base and most ruling party base. Mjini is a neutral district in affiliation and contains people with all perceptions. Scholars and practitioners who conduct research in Zanzibar politics argue that the revolution of Zanzibar is directly reflected in current political affiliations; therefore, the district is conducive for this study. Twenty-eight (28) participants were involved in the interview, including GNU top leaders and non-believers of the revolution ideologies.

The purposive selection of the participants was made using the experiences of the participants and their positions. The interviews were undertaken between October 2021 and September 2022 with data collection for my Ph.D. thesis entitled "The Institutionalisation of Power-sharing in Zanzibar." Both data were analyzed using thematic analysis. The data from interview and documentary reviews were familiarized and codified to answer the sub-themes, which were finally interpreted to answer the study question. The ethical matters considered throughout the interview include seeking permission and the safety of the participants. This includes seeking permission from the authorized institution of the University of Dodoma and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

These findings aim to answer two questions. The factor for shifting revolution ideology to grasp GNU and the status of revolution after the GNU implementation. These findings were supported by the scholar's literature and practices of stakeholders.

²⁵ Brown, "Political Tensions in Zanzibar : Echoes from the Revolution ? '."

²⁶ Fouéré, "Reinterpreting Revolutionary Zanzibar in the Media Today: The Case of Dira Newspaper"; Koenings, "For Us It ' s What Came After ": Locating Pemba in Revolutionary Zanzibar"; Suhonen, "Mapinduzi Daima – Revolution Forever : Using the 1964 Revolution in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar"; Lofchie, "Zanzibar: Background to Revolution."; Triplett, "Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality"; Brown, "Political Tensions in Zanzibar : Echoes from the Revolution ? '"; Burgess, "The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath"; Wilson, "Postcolonial Negotiations of Neoliberalism & Revolution at the State University of Zanzibar By"; Speller, "An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964";

Shifting of Revolution Ideology to GNU: Social, Political, and Economic Factors.

The 1964 revolution was taken as the base of Zanzibar's new political history and ideology. It is recognized as the beginning of the African leadership from colonialism and the basis of the country's daily government operations. Thus, any incumbent government should emphasize defending and protecting the revolution "*Mapinduzi*"²⁷ ideology. In the constitution, the protection and development of the revolution and its ideology were declared to be the first and most crucial aspect. In the preamble of the constitution, state;

*"... we consider and appreciate the good Revolutionary work carried out by the Leaders of the Revolution, led by the founder of the ASP Party and the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, the late Mzee Abeid Amani Karume, whose ideas will be developed and maintained forever, generation after generation in the fight against colonialism, capitalism, humiliation, bullying and contempt, and instead to maintain freedom and unity, justice and equality, honor and dignity."*²⁸

Maintaining the ideology and the philosophy of the 1964 revolution, the name of the Government was also declared to be the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGoZ). Again, the highest pillar of Government, the executive cabinet (ministerial cabinet), was also named the "Revolutionary Council." The aim was to reflect the 1964 revolution in the life of the new Government of Zanzibar. This indicates that the revolution is a base for political and governing functioning in Zanzibar.

Revolution in Zanzibar overrides the Independence of 1963; automatically, the revolution itself demarks the opposing groups, between those who support the 1964 revolution and those of 1963 independence. Therefore, prevailing the revolutionary ideology means maintaining two different members of the same community. The consequences of this were seen in politics and social activities soon after the revolution. For instance, as the prominent supporter of the political parties that won the 1963 Independence (ZPPP/ZNP) election, the Pemba region became the opposer of the supporters of the 1964 revolution of Unguja natives. This made the CUF termed the replica of 1963 Independence as it was based in Pemba, and the CCM a replica of the 1964 revolution based in Unguja. Rawlence argued that,

*"The current divisions between the two parties are more rooted in events since 1964 and pre-Revolutionary ties of class and race"*²⁹.

With these two main camps, the unity government was seen as a mere dream. Several attempts at unity government were initiated in 1999, 2000, and 2001. However, the attempt fails as each camp fears the other group.

Society changes with time, the generation passes, and the past narratives are no longer a case. These changes affect societal institutions and behavior as well. It is an emergent change where society grows from one reality to another unconsciously and through experiences³⁰. This gradual societal change with time made it possible for Zanzibaris with different ideologies on revolution to work together in the Unity government. More than forty-five (45) years lie between the revolution and GNU. As a new generation did not leave with past narratives, they became much more neutral than the society lived with the narrations. The top GNU leader from the opposition party, in an interview, states;

*"Things have changed a lot, and the past narration is no longer a base of social interaction and life. The new generations who did not live harshly with revolution and independence narratives are many more than those who live with those narratives".*³¹

²⁷ Mapinduzi is the Swahili term used to mean revolution

²⁸ Section of Zanzibar Constitution

²⁹ Rawlence, "Briefing: The Zanzibar Election."

³⁰ Practice and Holmes, "A Three-Fold Theory of Social Change."

³¹ The interview by the top GNU opposition leader, 23/10/2021

The population diversity of Zanzibar shows that about sixty percent of Zanzibar are youth. This generation is a mixture of different races and regions due to intermarriage and residence. This situation caused the emergence of a generation that cannot be based on either side due to the base from which they come. The Member of the reconciliation committee of GNU denotes that.

"The youth of 20 to 40 years exclude themselves with the narratives of their parents in the past. Some of them have mixed beliefs about revolution. Most of them think it is just a bothered issue to talk about the revolutionary narratives. To a large extent, this helps much to bury the previous division".³²

The revolution and independence radicals disappeared as time passed, and the opportunist generation appeared. So, seeing the revolutionary beliefs supporter's son or grandson who did not live with that ideology is normal in Zanzibar nowadays, unlike in the past, when the revolution supporters were the cut point of the society's division and exclusion. It was recorded during the post-revolution, and the so-called "*wapinga Mapinduzi*"³³ were not even considered Zanzibarian. They were excluded from the Government's social benefits, including employment opportunities³⁴. As time passes, the societal changes become more apparent, even in slow motion. As denoted by Glassman, that

"contemporary Zanzibar's communal identities are neither wholly inherited nor wholly invented'. People usually attend several group memberships, and various social identities influence and overlap."³⁵

This indicates that Zanzibar society has undergone several changes that shifted the revolution beliefs camp to group membership. Society has embraced the groups that benefit them rather than the beliefs of their ancestors.

Apart from natural social changes, the comfortability of social and political life in Zanzibar made the entertainment of power sharing. The difficulties and uncomfartability made society develop mechanisms for solving the problem. Peck argues,

"We are likelier to have our best moments when we are uncomfortable, sad, or unfulfilled. Only at these times, driven by our unease, will we likely break free from our ruts and seek more authentic solutions³⁶.

It is a proper case of Zanzibar. Adopting Zanzibar power-sharing was the free finding of the past narratives of 1963 and 1964, resulting in political instability and social unrest. The reconciliation committee member of GNU agreed with this argument in his statement;

"... We are tired of seeing in every election that Zanzibarians died, were injured, lost property, and were discriminated against by government forces. The citizens became worried once the election year; some families flew abroad due to election violence during the general election. We were tired. So we welcome GNU with the expectation of solving that problem..."³⁷

Not only comfortability from electoral violence but societal exclusion was among the reasons for entertaining the GNU and burying past narratives. In Zanzibar, the natives of the two regions were likely the citizens of the two enemy countries. The citizens of Micheweni Pemba witnessed this.

"...We decide to inter in the power-sharing to solve our society's social and political exclusion since 1964. For instance, the Pemba people were excluded from all social benefits, including

³² The interview by a member of reconciliation committee from opposition 16/12/2021

³³ Wapinga Mapinduzi is Swahili phrase which means the opposer of the revolution

³⁴ Bissell et al., Social Memory, Silenced Voices, and Political Struggle_ Remembering The.

³⁵ Moss and Tronvoll, "We Are All Zanzibari! Identity Formation and Political Reconciliation in Zanzibar."

³⁶ Peck, The Different Drum.

³⁷ The interview by a member of reconciliation committee from opposition 16/12/2021

*employment, social services, and even political benefits". Not only Pemba natives but even those from Unguja were also excluded through political affiliation."*³⁸

The citizens of Mjini Unguja revealed the likely opinion;

*"...It was reaching a time here in Pemba when there was a total dis-unity in the society and even some places in Unguja. Look at the same society living in neighborhoods excluded in funerals, mosques, and other social phenomena due to racism. Unguja and Upemba were the tools for dis-unity in Zanzibar. We were living like Palestinians and Israel. So, we welcome GNU, expecting it to help eliminate the problem..."*³⁹

The testimony from the different regions indicates that citizens were uncomfortable with the situation of violence and exclusion of the citizens of the same countries using past issues. This made the GNU to be taken with the two hands.

As part of the social factors, the external political forces also accelerate the welcoming of power-sharing in the aisles. Zanzibar is a political entity in the United Republic of Tanzania. The instability of Zanzibar affects the stability of the Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania acts as a neutral tool to the Unguja and Pemba divisions. The effort made by Tanzania to make the Island stable is visible and recorded. For instance, in adopting power sharing in Zanzibar in 2010, President Kikwete of the Republic played a significant role. The reconciliation meeting between the two parties took place in Bagamoyo from 25th February to 29th February 2008 under the support of President Kikwete of the republic. This was done because the division that prevailed in Zanzibar accelerated violence, affecting Tanzania.

Economically, the poverty line in the Pemba region made the citizens neutralize their stands so that the development planning could reach them. It reached a time in Pemba when the government and investment projects were sabotaged. So, the investors' assurance was low, resulting in the investors chasing away their project. The former minister of Zanzibar witnesses this in the interview;

*"...The investment company needs its long-term capital safety, and no investors would invest, knowing that every five years, his capital will perish away by election violence. Pemba region was the victim of this. Thus, they welcome peace agreement with two hands."*⁴⁰

About 90 percent of the residents of Pemba accept power sharing due to the economic and political problems they face. The problems originated from the revolution of 1964, whereby the Pemba region was termed the opposer of the revolution.

The changes in Zanzibar that enabled the grasp of power-sharing from the fractured ideology were highly influenced by emergent and recurrent internal and external factors. The changes through time have a significant impact as they are linear and unconscious. Nature forces it, and it is hard to be reversible⁴¹. In Zanzibar's case, it is difficult for the new generation to make political or social decisions using the revolution and independence narratives. Such a situation helps the new generation make rational decisions on political matters like power sharing. The need for self-satisfaction and comfort in economics and politics forces citizens to ignore history.

The Status of Revolution Ideology after the GNU

As elaborated in the above sections, the revolution ideology was naturally divisive. The division and political stability that marred the Island for a long time was, in one way or another, a product of the revolution and its philosophy. As time passed, the mechanism to solve that division was introduced.

³⁸ The interview by Micheweni citizen 29/11/2021.

³⁹ The interview by a Micheweni citizen 24/11/2021

⁴⁰ The interview by former minister of Zanzibar

⁴¹ Barth, "On the Study of Social Change."

Luckily, the Power-sharing Agreement 2010 enabled the two constraining camps to work together. This section will pinpoint the outcome of the power-sharing in the previous ideology of revolution.

It is a fact that the echo of revolution remains in Zanzibar through its philosophy. Still, the inclusion of so-called opposers of revolution in the revolution government made the society feel that all societies have the right to their Government. The study conducted by Pius (2020) on power-sharing and political culture in Zanzibar reveals that the citizens agree that the government institution can be shared by both the opposition and the winning party's leaders⁴². Also, the government institution tolerates opposition supporters in the Government, which was unlikely in the previous days, whereby being in opposition was a curse. The political activist agreed with this argument in the interview as he said,

"...After adopting power-sharing in 2010, you can open your party affiliation as a public servant like me. Before that, we hid our party affiliation because once your boss knew you were the opposition, he could be isolated and perhaps deployed to another office. The deployment will continue to every office..."⁴³

The constant and continuous employment of public servants from the opposition and the past ideology of revolution that emphasizes the isolation of opposers for revolution seem to be buried. This result is likely the same as the study of Haji (2023), which shows that the region and race is not the indicator of having public services now a day in Zanzibar⁴⁴.

Again, the power-sharing witnessed the breakdown of solid identity-based politics between Unguja and Pemba. This is seen through the electoral results before and after power sharing. Table 1 below shows the mixture of political parties' victories in both regions, Unguja and Pemba, unlike the previous politics.

Table 1. The Presidential Vote percentage that CCM and CUF/ACT Wazalendo Party won between Unguja and Pemba.

Years	Presidential vote percent			
	Unguja		Pemba	
	CCM	CUF/ACT	CCM	CUF/ACT
1995	73.5	26.5	17.8	82.2
2000	86.1	13.9	25.3	74.7
2005	74	26	16	84
2010	70.7	29.3	18.6	81.4
2016 re-election	CUF boycotted the election. No competition			
2020	86.5	13.5	54.7	45.3

Source: ZEC (1999, 2000, 2005, 2020, 2015, 2020)

The politics before power-sharing are not the same as after power-sharing. As an example, the election results from 2010 and before are different. Witnesses have reported seeing political identities and parties intersect. Unlike past years when Pemba was a pure opposition territory, the ruling party's adherents won the Pemba region, which serves as its base. For example, in the 2020 election, CUF received four constituencies in Unguja; CCM received fourteen seats in Pemba (refer to Table 2).

⁴² John, "Political Culture and Power Sharing in Zanzibar : The Case of The 2010 General Election."

⁴³ The interview by a political activist 14, 09/11/2022

⁴⁴ Haji, "Power-Sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation in Zanzibar, Tanzania."

Table 2. The Constituents Won by CCM and CUF/ACT Wazalendo Party between Unguja and Pemba.

Years	Constituents			
	Unguja		Pemba	
	CCM	CUF/ACT	CCM	CUF/ACT
1995	27	2	0	21
2000	29	0	5	16
2005	31	1	0	18
2010	28	4	0	18
2016 re-election	CUF boycotted the election. No competition			
2020	32	0	14	4

Source: ZEC (1999, 2000, 2005, 2020, 2015, 2020)

The opposition received many votes in Unguja once more, while CCM received many in Pemba. The election results from 2010 to 2020 show that political parties and other cross-cutting political activities have steadily expanded. The opposition party (CUF/ACT Wazalendo) in Pemba and the ruling party (CCM) in Unguja Island were backed by this study's findings despite the undeniable fact that Unguja Islanders favored the opposition. For example, in the 2010 election, the CUF secured four seats in Zanzibar's electoral history. It cast 29.3% of all the votes in Unguja that year. With 54.7% of the votes cast in Pemba in 2020, CCM received 14 component seats on the Pemba side.

This percentage represents the most significant amount in Zanzibar's election history. The election outcome suggests that people in Pemba and Unguja have changed their opinions. There is fierce rivalry among the CCM members in Pemba these days for intra-party selection. In contrast to previous years, when CCM supporters did not try to compete with CUF in Pemba, they knew they had little chance of succeeding. During an interview, a member of the House of Representatives from CCM in the Pemba area stated,

"Nowadays, there is a chance of CCM winning constituents in Pemba, so the intra-party selection is very tough. Many youths enter the competition because there is a chance for the CCM to win in Pemba. See an example of 2020: fourteen seats in Pemba go to CCM..."⁴⁵

Once more, the Pemba area was the most negatively impacted by exclusion. Numerous academics, such as Bakari (2001) and Killian (2008), have contended that political affiliations have excluded or embraced Pemba locals. However, as time passes, an exclusion apparent in the years following the revolution has been eliminated recently. According to the study's respondents, Pemba locals have had little trouble integrating into many facets of society, including government possibilities, in recent times. Political continuity in Zanzibar is less likely due to cross-cutting political parties and social contacts between the poles. Because of the lowering of the distinct line cleavage between subcultures (Unguja and Pemba), such cross-cutting political parties limit the autonomy of having power-sharing (Lijphart, 1968, 1969). The Member of the opposition party in the House of Representatives observes that,

⁴⁵ The interview by a member of House of Representatives from Pemba 18/11/2022

"A lot has changed; the social and political narratives of 1964 do not apply to 1995 or 2010. In 2020, there is complete cooperation between political parties in Pemba and Unguja. Thus, the characters from the original stories are no longer excluded based on area or allegiance".⁴⁶

Native Pemba people can now participate in government operations without disruptions, thanks to the societal shift. This resulted in Pemba's top-level leadership in 2010 through affiliation with CCM. Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein headed the Revolution Government for ten years at the 2010 general election. At the previous time, it was forbidden for Pemba natives to become top leaders. A Swahili phrase says, *"Wapemba ni kama kutu la ngombe juu kavu chini bichi"*⁴⁷. This means that Wapemba is like cow dung on the top, dry on the bottom, and green on the bottom. The Dr. Shein administration justified the mixed political allegiance and high rate of racial mixing between Pemba and Unguja, making it more difficult for the younger and new generations to be marginalized via identification.

On the side of society's division between the two polarities, which have different opinions on revolution, this study found that after power sharing, the community lives together without considering the past narration. In Zanzibar, there is a total interaction between races and regions. The citizens in the Mjini region witness this;

"... "Here in our village, we live like there is no different political affiliation, beliefs, and race. The GNU made people take politics not as seriously as they used before".⁴⁸

Another citizen added this;

"In Micheweni, each party can conduct political activities without harassment or isolation. Before power-sharing, the differentiation in political affiliation and region was observed openly. CCM followers used to have funerals, shops, and Mosques, and CUF had their own. But after GNU, people are at least now living together."⁴⁹

Even the Government nowadays considers Pemba not the enemy of the revolution, unlike in previous times. The economic and social opportunities are equally divided by the Government. The political activist from the Unguja district argued that

"... At least now the employment opportunity and service seem in Pemba, but still there is an unequal distribution of the economic gain and wealth between the region and its people.."⁵⁰

Another interviewee from the respondents in the Mjini District testifies to this:

... To me, power sharing creates a politics of opportunity in the Pemba region; nowadays, people look for where they can get benefits. Pemba natives start to forget their genesis' races and parties and look at the benefits. Power sharing increased the economic opportunity in the Pemba region."⁵¹

Power-sharing successfully balanced economic and social opportunities in the Pemba region. As a result, the Pemba natives were reduced from harsh resistance to the revolutionary Government and its plan as it was before power sharing. These factors made it possible for Zanzibari social connections to change: the superordinate Zanzibar identity grew more significant, and the previous CUF–CCM/Pemba–Unguja dichotomy lost influence in the political discourse of the archipelago.

⁴⁶ The Member of the ruling party in the House of Representatives 26/10/2021.

⁴⁷ This is a Swahili common phrase of politics used by the natives of Unguja to disqualify the leaders from Pemba.

⁴⁸ The interview by citizen in Mjini 29/11/2022

⁴⁹ The interview by citizens in Mjini, 30/11/2022

⁵⁰ Interview by a political activist 08/12/2021

⁵¹ The interview by citizens in Mjini, 30/11/2022

CONCLUSION

It is a non-denial fact that the 1964 revolution ideology prevails in the daily socio-political life in Zanzibar due to its influence on public activities. The manipulated ideology of revolution caused division in society. However, the ideology has undergone emerging and recurrent changes. The natural shift of society's generation influenced the changes of revolutionary ideology from the politics of isolation and exclusion to the politics of nationalization. What is noticed is that the revolutionary ideologies became neutralized as time passed, and new political practices of neutrality became institutionalized in the society. Artificial forces also is another push factor for society's change. An important consideration is the introduction of power-sharing following the 2010 elections. Zanzibar's political landscape has seen a substantial and positive transformation.

At least temporarily, the political memory of contentious politics, fierce partisanship, radical politics of identity, and previous hate politics zero-sum politics has vanished. A politics of consensus and debate have displaced their place to some extent. This is noticed by how powerful politicians worked together in the day-to-day operations of politics. Society changes, and the need for the party followers' satisfaction strongly supports this situation. It is a message that the changes that made the power-sharing adoption and its continuity are a desire of both leaders and citizens who seem to think that the past narrative should not decide their future. Rational judgment should place the past bad practices in society. Although the Zanzibar power-sharing currently involves only the leaders and elite classes of the two major political parties, the readiness of the citizens to bury the previous politics of division becomes the strong stone for its survival. For instance, the harsh identity politics practices of the multiparty system in the 1990s were different from the practices after the power-sharing adoption.

It is argued that the GNU of Zanzibar indicates society's change and growth. For Zanzibar politics, sharing power between the so-called supporters and opposers of 1964 revolutionary ideology was impossible during the post-revolution period. It is not realistic to discuss any "fundamental" political changes in Zanzibar without discussing the parties' relationship, as each party was the indicator of two different ideologies of the 1964 revolution. The inclusive parliament and executive cabinet justify the new sharing behavior built in the current society. Even though political parties and elites continue using the 1964 revolution as the supporters of their political benefits, its usability has decreased. The case of Zanzibar justifies the role and position of power-sharing in neutralizing the society's profoundly divided and plural character. Even though the political problem is not perfectly solved, neutralizing the two camps with two backgrounds of revolution in Zanzibar is well established. Institutionalizing the power-sharing practices in Zanzibar is essential for boosting the transformation of the revolution ideology from isolation and exclusion to nationalization and future peace and stability.

REFERENCES

- Barth, Fredrik. "On the Study of Social Change." *American Anthropologist* 69, no. 6 (December 1967): 661–69. <https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1967.69.6.02a00020>.
- Bissell, William, Cunningham, Fouere, and Marie-Aude. *Social Memory, Silenced Voices, and Political Struggle_ Remembering The*. Edited by Marie-Aude Bissell, William Cunningham, Fouere. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, n.d.
- Bissell, William Cunningham, and Marie-Aude Fouéré. "Memory, Media, and Mapinduzi." In *Social Memory, Silenced Voices, and Political Struggle*, 1–36. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvh8r429.7>.
- Brown, Andrea. "Political Tensions in Zanzibar : Echoes from the Revolution ?'." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue* 5189, no. August (2016).
- Burgess, G. Thomas. "The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*

-
- of *African History*. Oxford University Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.155>.
- Davies, James. "Sociological" 27, no. 1 (2009): 5–19.
- Eddoumi N. "The Zanzibar Revolution of 1964." *Global African History, Events*, 2021, 1–57.
- Fouéré, Marie Aude. "Reinterpreting Revolutionary Zanzibar in the Media Today: The Case of Dira Newspaper." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 4 (2012): 672–89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2012.729781>.
- Gebil, Alazar. "Causes of Political Revolution," 1990, 79.
- Haji, Moh'd. "Power-Sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation in Zanzibar, Tanzania." *African Journal of Political Science* 10, no. 2 (27th February, 2023): 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.36615/ajps.v10i2.1362>.
- Inwegen, Patrick Van. "Revolution," 2011.
- John, Pius. "Political Culture and Power Sharing in Zanzibar : The Case Of The 2010 General Election." University of Dodoma, 2020.
- Killian, Bernadeta. "The State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania." *African Identities* 6, no. 2 (2008): 99–125. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840801933932>.
- Kimmel, Michael S. "Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity." *Toward a New Psychology of Gender*, 2013, 223–42. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315811505-21>.
- Koenings, Nathalie Arnold. "'For Us It's What Came After': Locating Pemba in Revolutionary Zanzibar," 2018.
- Lofchie, Michael. "Lofchie, M. F. (1965). Zanzibar: Background to Revolution.," 1965.
- Loimeier, Roman. "Memories of Revolution:" In *Social Memory, Silenced Voices, and Political Struggle*, 37–78. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvh8r429.8>.
- Longman, Timothy. "Zanzibar : Religion , Politics , and Identity in East Africa," 2013.
- Mapuri, Omar. *The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects*. TEMA PUBLISHER, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania:, 1996.
- Moss, Sigrun Marie, and Kjetil Tronvoll. "'We Are All Zanzibari!' Identity Formation and Political Reconciliation in Zanzibar." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 1 (2nd January 2015): 91–109. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.985357>.
- Myers, Garth A. "Narrative Representations of Revolutionary Zanzibar." *Journal of Historical Geography* 26, no. 3 (2000): 429–48. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jhge.2000.0237>.
- Nassor, Aley Soud, and Jim Jose. "Journal of Southern African Studies Power-Sharing in Zanzibar : From Zero- Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus?," no. April 2015 (2014): 37–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2014.896719>.
- Peck, S. *The Different Drum*. Un availab. Touchstone., 2010.
- Practice, Implications, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. "A Three-Fold Theory of Social Change." *Community Development Resource Association*, 2007. https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Poverty-Wellbeing/Documents/media_-_addressing_poverty_in_practice_-_impact_hypotheses_-_reeler_a_theory_of_social_change.pdf.

- Ramadhani, Lupa. "Identity Politics and Conflicts in Zanzibar." *The African Review : A Journal of African Politics , Development and International* 44, no. 2 (2017): 172–202.
- Rawlence, Ben. "Briefing: The Zanzibar Election." *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (1st July, 2005): 515–23. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adi062>.
- Rejai, Mostafa. *The Strategy of Political Revolution*. Anchor Press, 1973. <https://www.amazon.com/strategy-political-revolution-Mostafa-Rejai/dp/0385002688>.
- Rios, Carl. "Report: West Point Undergraduate Historical Review Controlled Chaos: Why The Revolution In Zanzibar Was Not Genocide" 2, no. 2 (2023).
- Roop, Sterling, Kjetil Tronvoll, and Nicodemus Minde. "The Politics of Continuity and Collusion in Zanzibar: Political Reconciliation and the Establishment of the Government of National Unity." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 56, no. 2 (2018): 245–67. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000162>.
- Sheriff, Abdul. "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar." *Africa Spectrum* 36, no. 3 (2001): 301–18.
- Speller, Ian. "An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 2 (2007): 283–302. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086530701337666>.
- Suhonen, Riikka. "Mapinduzi Daima – Revolution Forever : Using the 1964 Revolution in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar," no. July (2009).
- Triplett, George W. "Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9, no. 4 (1971): 612–17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0005285X>.
- Wilson, Alexander X. "Postcolonial Negotiations of Neoliberalism & Revolution at the State University of Zanzibar By," 2022, 1–98.



© 2024 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY SA) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>).